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On the Divergent American Reactions to Terrorism and Climate Change
Cass R. Sunstein*

Abstract
Two of the most important sources of catastrophic risk are terrorism and climate
change. The United States has responded aggressively to the risk of terrorism while
doing very little about the risk of climate change. For the United States alone, the cost of
the Iraq war is now in excess of the anticipated cost of the Kyoto Protocol. The
divergence presents a puzzle; it also raises more general questions about both risk
perception and the public demand for legislation. The best explanation for the divergence
emphasizes bounded rationality. Americans believe that aggressive steps to reduce the
risk of terrorism promise to deliver significant benefits in the near future at acceptable
cost. By contrast, they believe that aggressive steps to reduce the risk of climate change
will not greatly benefit American citizens in the near future—and they are not willing to
pay a great deal to reduce that risk. This intuitive form of cost-benefit analysis is much
influenced by behavioral factors, including the availability heuristic, probability neglect,
outrage, and myopia. All of these contribute, after 9/11, to a willingness to support
significant steps to respond to terrorism and to relative indifference to climate change. It
follows that Americans are likely to support such steps in response to climate change
only if one of two conditions is met: the costs of those steps can be shown to be
acceptably low or new information, perhaps including a salient incident, indicates that
Americans have much to gain from risk reduction in the relatively near future.

*

Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor, Law School and Department of Political
Science, University of Chicago. I am grateful to Elizabeth Emens, Jacob Gersen, Robert Hahn, Eric Posner,
Richard Posner, and Adrian Vermeule for valuable comments on a previous draft. Thanks to Jennifer Rho
for excellent research assistance.

“Climate change is the most severe problem that we are facing today—more serious even
than the threat of terrorism.”
Sir David King1
“I see little evidence, at least in the United States, that people want to make significant
additional sacrifices to raise living standards among the people who live now in the developing
world. It would surprise me if they could get excited about raising living standards in those same
parts of the world at a future time . . . .”
Thomas Schelling2
“The greater the apparent threat from visible forms of pollution and the more vividly this
can be dramatized, the more public support environmental improvement will receive and the
longer it will sustain public interest. Ironically, the cause of ecologists would therefore benefit
from an environmental disaster like a ‘killer smog’ that would choke thousands to death in a few
days.”
Anthony Downs3

I. Introduction
It is an understatement to say that in the last decade, a great deal of attention has
been paid to terrorism and climate change. What unifies the two sets of risks is their
potentially catastrophic quality.4 The attacks of 9/11 killed about three thousand people,
an unquestionably large number; but other forms of terrorism, perhaps involving
biological or nuclear weapons, could kill many more, conceivably a million people or
more.5 Some of the worst-case scenarios associated with climate change involve many
millions of deaths as a direct and indirect result of warmer temperatures.6 Human beings
face a number of catastrophic risks, but terrorism and climate change rank among the
most serious.
The two risks share an additional feature. It is difficult to assign probabilities to
the worst-case outcomes. Officials cannot reasonably say that the risk of a catastrophic
terrorist attack, in the next ten years, is somewhere between (say) 5% and 30%. The same
might well be true of climate change. On one estimate, the risk of catastrophe, by the year
2100, is somewhere between 2% and 6%.7 But many people believe that we lack
1

David A. King, Climate Change Science: Adapt, Mitigate, or Ignore, 303 Science 176 (2004).
Thomas Schelling, Intergenerational Discounting, in Discounting and Intergenerational Equity 101
(Paul Portney and John Weyant eds. 1999).
3
Anthony Downs, Up and Down with Ecology—The “Issue Attention Cycle,” 28 The Public Interest
38, 46 (1972).
4
See, e.g., Richard Posner, Catastrophe 43-58, 75-86 (2005); Martin Rees, Our Final Hour (2003);
Mark Maslin, Global Warming 83-101 (2004); William Nordhaus and Joseph Boyer, Warming the World
87-89, 93-94 (2003).
5
See Posner, supra note, at 75-86; Robert Goodin, What’s Wrong With Terrorism? 119 (noting risk of
a million deaths from efficient biological attack) (2006).
6
See id.; Nordhaus and Boyer, supra note, at 78-83.
7
See id. at 88 (suggesting a 1.2% probability of a catastrophic impact with 2.5 degree Celsius
warming and a 6.8% probability with 6 degree Celsius warming). This estimate was obtained by starting
with a survey of relevant experts, using the median answer, and adjusting that answer upwards in
2
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sufficient information to assign a probability to that risk; there are simply too many
imponderables.8 In these domains, nations are plausibly thought to be operating in the
domain of uncertainty rather than risk, in the sense that they are able to identify the worst
outcomes without being able to specify the likelihood that they will occur.9 Both
terrorism and global warming, then, are potentially catastrophic risks whose probability
cannot easily be specified; they are also risks that are likely, if they come to fruition, to
affect many people at the same time.
My principal concern in this Article is the stark difference between American
reactions to terrorism-related risks and American reactions to the risks associated with
climate change.10 An explanation of this difference should cast light on the demand for
risk-related law in general; it should also provide a useful test of competing accounts of
how human beings think about social hazards. Hence I shall explore four different
approaches to risk perception: psychometric accounts, including more recent versions
that rely on the affect heuristic; “cultural cognition,” emphasized by those who believe
that risk perception is best understood in terms of identifiable cultural dispositions;
standard accounts of rational choice, which emphasize costs and benefits; and behavioral
economics, stressing heuristics and biases. We shall see that psychometric accounts offer
at best limited help. Those who stress culture do illuminate internal divisions on the
underlying questions, but they cannot fully account for the current situation. For these
reasons, accounts based on the psychometric paradigm and on culture offer inadequate
explanations.
The best account is behavioral in character; it emphasizes the extent to which the
public demand for regulation is based on intuitive cost-benefit analysis, affected by
bounded rationality. In that analysis, both costs and benefits very much matter, but their
assessment is influenced by heuristics and biases, including the availability heuristic and
an undue emphasis on short-term effects. As we shall see, American judgments about
climate change are greatly affected by both “unavailability bias” and myopia. In part
because of the absence of vivid illustrations of harm, Americans believe that they have
relatively little to gain from serious efforts to reduce the risks of climate change; hence
they are unwilling to spend a great deal to reduce those risks. To this extent, an intuitive
form of cost-benefit analysis explains American practice; it also helps to account for

accordance with more recent information. See id. Under the circumstances, with so much uncertainty and
rapidly changing data, there is no reason for great confidence in the resulting figures.
8
See Posner, supra note, at 49; Maslin, supra note, at 97 (noting projection of potential increase in
malaria, by 2080s, of 260-320 million people).
9
For a lucid treatment, see Jon Elster, Explaining Technical Change 185-207 (1983). I am bracketing
many complexities here. It is possible that the uncertainty is bounded, in the sense that experts can say,
with some confidence, that the risk of catastrophic climate change is over 1% but below 40%; perhaps the
same is true for terrorism. For present purposes, it is not necessary to explore these questions.
10
Other risks share many of the characteristics of terrorism and global warming, see Posner, supra
note, and Rees, supra note. It would undoubtedly be illuminating to investigate American reactions to those
risks as well. But the divergence explored here is especially striking, and a great deal of information is
available with which to untangle the puzzle.
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European receptivity to risk-reduction efforts, because the analysis is much more
favorable to risk reduction in Europe.11
By contrast, Americans typically believe that certain efforts to combat terrorism
are likely to do more good than harm. Their judgments to this effect are influenced by
highly salient incidents that affect both thought and behavior. Because of the attacks of
9/11, the threat of terrorism is highly salient to most Americans; there is no 9/11 for
climate change. At the same time, Americans almost certainly have much to lose with
aggressive regulation of greenhouse gases,12 and an appreciation of the relevant costs
affects their judgments about appropriate regulation.
My goals here are positive, not normative. I do not mean to suggest any particular
approach to the problems of terrorism and climate change, or to endorse any view about
how to rank or compare the two problems. Those who believe that climate change is the
more serious problem might be tempted to explain the divergent reactions by reference to
the power of well-organized interests in the United States, or some combination of
selfishness, ignorance, and obtuseness on the part of those responsible for American law
and policy. Those who believe that terrorism is self-evidently the more serious problem,
and that climate change poses speculative risks for which it is appropriate to “wait and
learn,”13 may find no puzzle at all. But whatever one’s view about the normative issues,
the question of risk perception should have independent interest. As we shall see, it
would be most surprising if judgments about risks of this kind were unerring or if they
closely tracked expert opinion. The demand for risk regulation raises important puzzles
of its own14; and the supply is affected by the demand.
Although I do not explore the normative issues, there is a clear prescriptive
implication: The United States is unlikely to take significant steps to reduce greenhouse
gases unless the costs of risk reduction are much decreased, an available incident or
political leaders trigger fear of relatively imminent harm, or both. Altruistic or selfinterested actors, in the private or public sphere, might well be able to enlist these points
in any effort to increase the likelihood that the public will respond.
The remainder of this Article comes in five parts. Part II briefly outlines
Americans beliefs and practices. Parts III, IV, V, and VI explore the four accounts,
beginning with those that are least helpful in explaining the basis puzzle and culminating
in an approach based on bounded rationality. Part III explores the psychometric
paradigm. Part IV turns to the idea of cultural cognition. Part V investigates the
11

See Nordhaus and Boyer, supra note, at 162-63, and in particular the suggestion that the “major
beneficiary of the environmental effects of reducing emissions is Europe. The net economic impact on
OECD Europe is positive in all experiments . . . with the environmental benefits ranging from $35 to $127
billion.” Id. at 162.
12
See id. at 161, 168, with the suggestion that “the United States is a net loser while the rest of the
world on balance benefits from the Kyoto Protocol.”
13
See Robert Mendelsohn, Perspective Paper No. 1., in Global Crises, Global Solutions 44-47 (Bjorn
Lomborg ed. 2005)
14
See George Loewenstein and Jane Mather, Dynamic Processes in Risk Perception, 3 J. Risk and
Uncertainty 155 (1990).
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relationships among costs, benefits, and attitudes toward climate change and terrorism.
Part VI explores bounded rationality, with special attention to intuitive cost-benefit
balancing and the role of the availability heuristic, probability neglect, outrage, and
myopia.
II. Beliefs and Practices
With respect to climate change and terrorism, American beliefs and practices are
complex and variable. Of course there is a degree of heterogeneity. The basic story,
however, is relatively straightforward, and it reveals a sharp asymmetry in reactions to
the two sets of risks.
A. Climate Change
In terms of legal mandates, the United States has done essentially nothing to
reduce the emission of greenhouse gases, relying largely on collecting information about
emissions levels and encouraging further research.15 One of the nation’s principal goals is
an 18% improvement in greenhouse gas intensity between 2002 and 2012,16 with
intensity measured as emissions per unit of gross domestic product (GDP). But this goal
is an aspiration, not a requirement,17 and in any case significant reductions in greenhouse
gas intensity can be accompanied by extremely large increases in greenhouse gas
emissions.18
To be sure, substantial resources are being devoted to research.19 In 2005, over $5
billion was appropriated for climate change programs and energy tax incentives; a 4.8%
increase is planned for 2006.20 More than $2 billion has specifically been appropriated for
the Climate Change Science Program and the Climate Change Research Program, both
designed to analyze existing trends and to explore possible solutions.21 Since 1992, the
15

For overviews, see http://www.state.gov/g/oes/rls/fs/46741.htm and http://www.epa.gov/globalwarming/, in
particular the reports mentioned at http://yosemite.epa.gov/oar/globalwarming.nsf/content /actions.html;
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/06/20010611-2.html; Daniel R. Abbasi, Americans and Climate
Change 20-23 (2006). On June 22, 2005, a 53-44 majority of the United States Senate approved a “sense of
the Senate” resolution to the effect that “Congress should enact a comprehensive and effective national
program of mandatory market-based limits and incentives on greenhouse gases that slow, stop and reverse
the growth of such emissions . . . .” Id. at 20. The most aggressive legislative proposal, from Senators John
McCain and Joseph Lieberman in 2003, would have capped greenhouse gas emissions at 2000 levels. The
proposal was defeated by a vote of 55–43. For an overview, see
http://commerce.senate.gov/newsroom/printable.cfm?id=214305; for an analysis, see Sergey Paltsev et al.,
Emissions Trading to Reduce Greenhouse Gases in the United States: The McCain-Lieberman Proposal,
available at http://web.mit.edu/globalchange/www/reports.html.
16
For a helpful outline, see http://www.pewclimate.org/policy_center/analyses/response_bushpolicy.cfm
17
See id.
18
This in fact has been the experience of the United States between 1990 to 2004, with significant
reductions in greenhouse gas intensity (by 21%) accompanied by significant growth in carbon dioxide
emissions (by 19%). See Energy Information Administration, Emissions of Greenhouse Gases in the United
States 2004 at xii (2005).
19
See http://www.usgcrp.gov/
20

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/05/20050518-4.html

21

Id.
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Department of Energy has been required to estimate aggregate greenhouse gas emissions
in the United States, and annual reports are available.22 These estimates are mandated by
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, signed by the United
States
One of the most ambitious current programs involves company-by-company
reporting of actions taken to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, but this program itself
remains voluntary,23 in sharp contrast to the reporting requirements in other federal
statutes.24 Hence the United States lacks a company-by-company Greenhouse Gas
Inventory, comparable to the Toxic Release Inventory that has played such a large role in
reducing toxic emissions.25At the international level, the most aggressive program in
which the United States now participates is the “methane to markets” agreement,26 but
this agreement is only a modest contribution to greenhouse gas abatement.27 No
regulatory limits are imposed on greenhouse gases from fossil fuels, motor vehicles, or
any other source, notwithstanding efforts to require the government to impose such
limits.28
State and local governments have undertaken some action on their own. In
December 2005, the governors of seven states signed a Memorandum of Understanding,
designed to create a regional “cap-and-trade” plan to reduce power plant emissions.29 The
mayors of over 200 cities, including over 43 million Americans, have pledged to meet
city-level goals corresponding with the requirements of the Kyoto Protocol.30 In June
2005, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger pledged to reduce California’s greenhouse gas
emissions to 1990 levels by 2020, a pledge that helped lead to the West Coast Governor’s
Global Warming Initiative, which includes California, Washington, and Oregon.31
California has enacted legislation to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases from
automobiles, with a 22% reduction target by 2012 and a 30% reduction target by 2016.32
These various initiatives go well beyond the actions of the national government, but even
22

Energy Information Administration, supra note, at ES-1; http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/1605a.html;
http://yosemite.epa.gov/oar/globalwarming.nsf/content/ResourceCenterPublicationsGHGEmissionsUSEmissionsInvent
ory2006.html
23
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/frntvrgg.html. For an example of a voluntary report from General
Motors Corporation, see
http://www.gm.com/company/gmability/environment/news_issues/news/ghgreport_2003.pdf
24

See id.; 42 USC 13385 (requiring inventory of national aggregate emissions of each greenhouse gas
for each calendar year for baseline period of 1987 through 1990, updated annually); 42 USC 7651k
(requiring monitoring and computing of aggregate annual total carbon dioxide emissions, to be made
available to the public).
25
See James T. Hamilton, Regulation through Revelation: The Origin, Politics, and Impacts of the
Toxic Release Inventory Program (2005).
26
See http://www.methanetomarkets.org/; http://www.epa.gov/methanetomarkets/basicinfo.htm
27
See Energy Information Administration, supra note, at iii-xx, showing that methane is a relatively
small component of aggregate American contributions to climate change.
28
Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50 (DC Cir 2005).
29
See www.rggi.org
30
See www.ci.seattle.was.us/mayor.climate. For information on the Kyoto Protocol in general, see
Nordhaus and Boyer, supra note; http://unfccc.int/2860.php
31
See www.ef.org/westcoastclimate
32
See Abassi, supra note, at 21.
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as a whole, they are not projected to produce significant emissions reductions in the
United States.
The behavior of the government is not inconsistent with the views of the
American public, though those views are admittedly unstable and complex.33 On the one
hand, large majorities of Americans were found as early as 2000 to favor the Kyoto
Protocol34 (88%), believe that the United States should reduce its greenhouse gas
emissions (90%), support an increase in fuel economy standards (79%), and favor
government regulation of carbon dioxide as a pollutant (77%).35 In the same year, a slim
majority also supported a tax on “gas guzzlers” (54%).36 Restrictions on power plants,
designed to limit greenhouse gas emissions, were strongly supported (61%).37
On the other hand, strong majorities were opposed to a gasoline tax (78%) and to
a business energy tax (60%) designed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.38 In 2000, the
environment ranked only 16th among the most important problems in the nation, and of
these climate change was ranked 12th of thirteen environmental issues (below urban
sprawl).39 Notwithstanding the vast publicity given to climate change in recent years,
polls reached broadly similar conclusions in 2006, with Americans ranking the
environment twelfth on a list of the most important problems, below immigration, health
care, and gas and heating oil prices; among environmental problems, climate change was
ranked ninth, well below damage to the ozone layer (a problem that has long been
handled through regulatory controls).40 Another 2006 poll found that strong majorities of
Americans oppose an increase in taxes on electricity and gasoline as an attempt to reduce
climate change.41 In the same year, a different poll did find that 59% of Americans would
support an increase in the gasoline tax to reduce the threat of climate change, but the
magnitude of the increase was not specified.42 In late 2005, Americans were asked,
“Where should the US concentrate its resources if it could only guard against one
potential attack.” Nuclear power attracted the highest percentage of answers (39%);
environmental disasters were lowest on the list, at 10%.43

33

See Anthony Leiserowitz, Communicating the Risks of Global Warming: American Risk
Perceptions, Affective Images and Interpretive Communities, forthcoming in Communication and Social
Change: Strategies for Dealing with The Climate Crisis (S. Moser and L. Dilling eds., forthcoming);
Anthony Leiserowitz, Climate Change Risk Perception and Policy Preferences: The Role of Affect,
Imagery, and Values, Climate Change (forthcoming).
34
The United States has refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. See Robert Percival et al.,
Environmental Regulation 1070-71 (5th ed. 2003). For a list of the 163 nations that have ratified the
protocol, see http://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/kyoto_protocol/application/pdf/kpstats.pdf
35
Id.
36
Id.
37

http://www.pollingreport.com/enviro.htm

38

Id.
Id.
40
See the summary and overview in The New York Times, April 23, 2006, at 14.
39

41

http://www.pollingreport.com/enviro.htm
See http://environment.about.com/od/environmentallawpolicy/a/gasolinetax.htm.
43
See http://www.angus-reid.com/polls/index.cfm/fuseaction/viewitem/itemID/8371.
42
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It seems clear that while Americans show some and perhaps increasing concern
about climate change, they are not willing to sacrifice a great deal to reduce the
associated risks. As we shall see in more detail below, most Americans do not believe
that climate change poses a serious threat in the near future, and hence they do not think
that they, or their friends and family members, face a real risk in the short-term.44
Notably, citizens of many nations show more concern about global warming than
Americans do; higher levels of concern are found in Germany, Switzerland, Japan,
Ireland, Great Britain, Mexico, Brazil, Portugal, Canada, Denmark, Norway, Chile, and
Poland.45 In 2001, citizens in Europe in general and Britain in particular ranked the
environment as the largest global threat, above poverty, natural disasters, famine,
AIDS/HIV, and even war.46 Indeed, a majority of Britons (63%), polled in 2004, ranked
climate change as the most important environmental issue in the world.47 In the same
year, terrorism was ranked as the “most serious threat to the future wellbeing of the
world” by 48% of those polled, by global warming came in second, at 25%, about double
the number for population growth and AIDS/HIV.48 It is an understatement to say that the
issue of climate change has far less salience in the United States.
To be sure, Americans are relatively supportive of programs that, as they perceive
it, do not impose costs on the public but instead on “companies” or “power plants.” But
when the costs are not indirect, and are seen as requiring out-of-pocket expenditures,
their enthusiasm for legal controls on greenhouse gases diminishes dramatically.
What are the consequences of legal practices and social beliefs for greenhouse gas
emissions? Perhaps unsurprisingly, such emissions, in the United States, have been
increasing in the very period in which climate change has received attention both
domestically and abroad. Greenhouse gas emissions increased by no less than 15.8
percent between 1990 and 2004.49 In 1990, carbon dioxide emissions were 5,002.3
million metric tons; in 2004, they were 5.973.0 million metric tons, a jump of 19
percent.50 To be sure, greenhouse gas intensity has indeed been decreasing in the same
period, with a significant decline of 21%.51 But because of increased energy usage, per
capita emissions have actually increased over this period by 1.2%—an increase that,
alongside population growth, produced the increase in aggregate emissions.52
Fossil fuel combustion is by far the largest contributor to greenhouse gas
emissions in the United States, accounting for 98% of carbon dioxide emissions.
44

See notes infra.
See Steven Brechin, Comparative Public Opinion and Knowledge on Global Climatic Change and
the Kyoto Protocol: The U.S. Versus the World? 23 International J Sociology and Social Policy 106, 110
(2003).
46
See Andrew Norton and John Leaman, The Day After Tomorrow: Public Opinion on Climate
Change 4 (2004).
47
Id. at 5.
48
Id. at 6.
49
See Energy Information Administration, supra note, at ix; Record Increase in U.S. Greenhouse Gas
Emissions Sparks Global Controversy (2006), available at http://environment.about.com/b/a/256722.htm.
50
Energy Information Administration, supra note, at x, xii.
51
Id.
52
Id. at xii.
45
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Greenhouse gas emissions from this source has been growing in most sectors, with a
1.7% increase between 2003 and 2004.53 While methane emissions were reduced by 10%
in 2004, total greenhouse gas emissions increased by 1.7% in the same year, the largest
increase on record from any nation.54 All the principal sectors—which include
residential, commercial, industrial, and transportation-related uses—remain free from
national regulation. By contrast, substantial reductions in greenhouse gas emissions,
between 1990 and 2003, can be found in Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, the Czech Republic,
Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Russia, Ukraine, Iceland, Luxembourg, the United
Kingdom, Sweden, and Germany.55
B. Terrorism
With terrorism, the picture is very different. After the 9/11 attacks, the risk of
terrorism has been consistently ranked among the most pressing problems facing the
United States.56 It is an understatement to say that the American government has taken
massive steps to reduce terrorism-related risks. The most expensive are almost certainly
the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, undertaken in large part to reduce those risks. The war
in Iraq has been extremely costly. As of September 2005, $212 billion had been allocated
from the United States Treasury, and aggregate costs were estimated at $255 billion to
the United States, $40 billion to coalition partners, and $134 billion to Iraq, for a total
global cost of $428 billion.57 As of May 1, 2006, the appropriations were nearing $280
billion58—ensuring that the cost of the Iraq War, to the United States, will soon surpass
the total expected cost of the Kyoto Protocol, which on plausible assumption would have
been $325 billion.59 There is a great deal more in the way of costly activity, including
new legislation60 and numerous regulations.61
53

Id.
See Energy Information Administration, Emissions of Greenhouse Gases in the United States 2004
(2005); Record Increase in United States Greenhouse Gases Reported (2006), http://www.ens54

newswire.com/ens/apr2006/2006-04-18-02.asp
55

See UNFCCC, Key GHG Data: Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Emissions Data for 1990–2003, submitted
to the UNFCCC, at 16-17 (November 2, 2005). Notably, several countries show emissions increase
comparable to or higher than those of the United States; these include Canada (24.2%), New Zealand
(22.5%), Australia (23.3%), Austria (16.5%), Greece (24.8%), Ireland (25.6%), Portugal (36.7%), Spain
(41.7%), and Italy (11.5%).
56
In 2006, for example, 45% of Americans said that they worried “a great deal” about the possibility
of future terrorist attacks, the same percentage that worried about “crime and violence,” and a higher
percentage than worried about the economy, hunger and homelessness, and the environment. See note
supra.
57
See Scott Wallsten and Katrina Kosec, Economic Cost of the War in Iraq, available at http://aeibrookings.org/publications/abstract.php?pid=988
58

http://nationalpriorities.org/index.php?option=com_wrapper&Itemid=182

59

The figure is $325 billion, see Nordhaus and Boyer, supra note, at 161, a figure that might turn out
to be inflated if replacements for carbon dioxide have a diminishing cost as a result of technological
innovation.
60
See http://www.ncsl.org/programs/press/2002/pdcongress.htm for an overview; the most prominent
enactments include the USA Patriot Act, the Federal Aviation Security Act, and the Air Transportation
Safety and System Stabilization Act.
61
For an early catalogue, see Office of Management and Budget, Draft Report to Congress on the
Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations, 67 Federal Register 5014 - 15045. (March 28).
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With respect to the war on terror, Americans disagree on a great deal. But they
agree that the risk of terrorism is both serious and real, and they favor expensive
precautions to reduce that risk. In 2006, the Pew Research Center found that defending
the nation from terrorism was a “top priority” for 80% of Americans—a higher
percentage than for any other problem.62 In the period shortly after the 9/11 attacks, 88%
of Americans believed that it was either very likely or somewhat likely that there would
be “another terrorist attack within the next few months”—with about half of Americans
worrying about the possibility that a family member might “become a victim of a terrorist
attack,” and over 40% worrying that “terrorist attacks might take place where [they] live
or work.”63
Later studies have continued to show a high level of concern, with many people
believing that an imminent attack is likely.64 In July 2005, nearly half of respondents
described themselves as “somewhat” or “very” worried that they, or someone in their
family, would be a victim of terrorism.65 Nearly half also said that it was somewhat or
very likely that there would be a terrorist attack in the United States “in the next several
weeks.”66 There can be little doubt that the level of concern is lower now than it was in
the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, and that public fear will leap after any future
attack. But whatever emerges from any particular slice in time, it is clear that Americans
believe that they face a serious threat of a terrorist attack in the not-distant future and that
they and their loved ones are at risk. Americans are willing to support substantial
measures to reduce the threat.
C. Beliefs and Regulation
The divergent judgments about climate change and terrorism help to account for
governmental behavior. Of course there are many possible relationships between public
attitudes and government responses. For a general orientation, consider the following
table:
Officials Want Risk Reduction
Public Demands Risk
Reduction
Public Does Not Demand Risk
Reduction

62
63

War on terror after 9/11
Controls on ozone-depleting
chemicals; acid deposition
regulation

Officials Do Not Want Risk
Reduction
Superfund legislation; Alar
Controls on greenhouse gases;
airline security before 9/11

http://www.pollingreport.com/prioriti.htm.
See http://www.americans-world.org/digest/global_issues/terrorism/terrorism_perception.cfm.

64

A 2002 study, involving students at Harvard University, found a “best estimate” mean of 294 deaths
from terrorism in the next year, with an “upper bound” best estimate of 25,199. Interestingly, the upper
bound estimates of “total fatalities due to all terrorism” were lower than the upper bound estimates of “total
fatalities due to airplane terrorism”—a finding to which I will return. See W. Kip Viscusi and Richard
Zeckhauser, Sacrificing Civil Liberties to Reduce Terrorism Risks, 26 J Risk and Uncertainty 99 (2003).
65

http://www.usatoday.com/news/polls/2005-07-25-july-poll.htm

66

Id.
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We can easily imagine cases in which both the public and its representatives favor
risk reduction. After the attacks of 9/11, this was certainly the case with respect to the
war on terror. The same can plausibly be said about certain steps to reduce air pollution.67
In other contexts, the public does not demand risk reduction, but officials favor it; they
are permitted to take certain steps because the public does not oppose them, and electoral
retribution is unlikely. This was the case with respect to controls on acid deposition.68
Very different issues arise when the public demands some kind of regulatory
response, even though officials would not favor it on their own. For many officials, this
was the case with respect to the Superfund statute, designed to regulate abandoned
hazardous waste sites; the publicity given to the supposed disaster at Love Canal made a
statutory response almost inevitable, even though many officials did not favor it either
publicly or privately.69 The same category covers the public demand for some kind of
response to the health hazards allegedly associated with the pesticide Alar.70 The final
category consists of cases in which the public does not demand risk reduction at the same
time that officials do not want it. That category includes security measures in airports
before the attacks of 9/11.71 It is also a plausible account of the current situation with
respect to climate change.72
Of course these stylized categories ignore important variations. We can identify
cases in which the public does not merely fail to demand risk reduction, but would
affirmatively punish risk reduction efforts. Aggressive security measures at airports
before 9/11 would probably have fallen in this category, simply because such measures
would have been deemed a significant and unnecessary inconvenience. Where citizens
would face a large burden from risk reduction, there is a built-in obstacle to risk
reduction.73 Citizens would almost certainly resist a large increase in the gasoline tax,
even if the increase was defended by reference to environmental concerns, the interest in
energy self-sufficiency, or some combination of the two.74 We might be able to imagine
cases in which officials would be willing to block regulation even if the public demands
it. At the very least, officials might insist on a more tepid, less costly, and more symbolic
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response than the public would like.75 In the aftermath of public concern about toxic
releases from chemical plants, for example, the legislative response involved disclosure
requirements, not regulatory controls.76
Importantly, the category of “officials” contains a great deal of diversity. In the
table above, the term is meant to refer to those with some kind of formal position, and
thus includes mayors, governors, presidents, national and state legislators, and
bureaucrats in various levels of government. As we have seen, there may well be
disagreements or even conflicts among state and national governments; and career
bureaucrats may well differ from elected officials. In addition, the public is hardly
monolithic. Internal divisions within the citizenry can greatly complicate the political
economy of risk reduction, not least when well-organized private groups ensure that
government responses take their preferred form.77 In the context of terrorism, the airline
industry played a significant role in preventing more extensive security procedures before
9/11.78 By contrast, well-organized groups actually spurred American efforts to respond
to depletion of the ozone layer, because they had developed cheap substitutes for ozonedepleting chemicals, and sought to obtain a competitive advantage by increasing the
demand for those substitutes.79 DuPont, the world’s largest producer of CFCs, pledged to
phase out production by an early date, but warned “that international cooperation was
essential, and that participation in an agreement to phase out CFCs needed to be as broad
as possible, to avoid production by other manufacturers relocating to non-signatory
states.”80 On this count, the depletion of the ozone layer is altogether different from
climate change, for there can be no doubt that powerful organizations have played a role
in discouraging aggressive measures to control greenhouse gas emissions.81
There is an additional consideration. The public demand for regulatory controls is
not simply a brute fact. It shifts over time, often in response to the statements and actions
of influential people in the private and public sectors. Public opinion is endogenous to the
acts of both officials and well-organized groups. The level of concern with terrorism
would inevitably have been high in the aftermath of the attacks of 9/11; but it would have
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been possible for leaders to diminish that concern by (for example) giving assurances that
the risk was low and attempting to assimilate terrorism-related risks to those encountered
in ordinary life.82 To say the least, Americans leaders did not take this course,
emphasizing instead that we are “still not safe” and that ours is “a Nation in danger.”83
With respect to the war on terror, prominent officials have played a large role in
activating public concern, increasing the salience of the 9/11 attacks and invoking those
attacks to stress the need for protective measures.84 Such measures can themselves have a
role in forming both beliefs and desires. Aggressive security measures at airports, for
examples, are likely to intensify public fear, in a way that can heighten the demand for
further precautions. With respect to climate change, the most influential national leaders
have taken a quite different course. Far from activating concern, they have attempted to
dampen it.85 There are limits to the malleability of public opinion, but it is possible to
imagine a situation in which the objective facts are the same, but in which American
leaders increased concern about climate change but decreased concern about terrorism, to
the point where the divergent attitudes were not so divergent, at least after the lapse of
several years post-9/11. Hence the divergence is a product in part of simple facts, above
all the 9/11 attacks, but also of political responses to both sets of risks.
A full account of the political economy of risk regulation would have to give
careful attention to the effects of interest groups and officials in the process of belief
formation. But when public opinion is at least relatively stable and firm, it can make a
great deal of difference. If the public demands regulation, well-organized groups may
well be unable to prevent it86; and if the public resists regulation, well-organized groups
may well be unable to bring it about. Let us turn, then, to competing accounts of risk
perception.
III. The Psychometric Paradigm and Affect
A. Qualitative Factors and Risk
The psychometric paradigm may well have become the most influential account
of risk perception in the social sciences,87 including law.88 The goal of the psychometric
account is to explain the divergence between the risk-related judgments of experts and
those of ordinary people. A major conclusion is that ordinary people show a “richer”
rationality than that of experts, who focus on quantities alone.89 On this view, most
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people are attuned to far more than the number of lives at stake. They pay attention as
well to a range of qualitatively distinctive factors, not reducible to mere numbers. For
example, people are influenced by whether a risk is potentially catastrophic; faced by
future generations; involuntarily incurred; uncontrollable; delayed rather than immediate;
and particularly dread.90 The psychometric paradigm purports to explain why people are
so fearful of the risks associated with pesticides, herbicides, and nuclear power—risks
that do not greatly concern experts.91 The psychometric paradigm also claims to explain
why people are not much concerned about the risks associated with automobiles and xrays—risks that many experts believe to be quite substantial.92 When ordinary people
show a greater concern with nuclear power than with x-rays, it is because the former
poses risks that are delayed, involuntarily incurred, potentially catastrophic, unfamiliar,
and faced by future generations.93
The psychometric approach can certainly claim to account for heightened social
concern with terrorism, which is likely to trigger the standard grounds for “richer
rationality.” The risks associated with terrorism are particularly dreaded, and such risks
have the uncontrollable, unfamiliar, and potentially catastrophic qualities that are said to
produce intense reactions.94 But can the psychometric paradigm explain the asymmetrical
reactions to terrorism and climate change? At first glance, it cannot. Indeed, it would be
reasonable to say that if the psychometric paradigm is right, then climate change should
have a high priority, perhaps even higher one than terrorism. The risks associated with
climate change are certainly delayed rather than immediate, and they are imposed directly
on subsequent generations, which might face catastrophe. At least as much as terrorism,
the risks associated with climate change are involuntarily incurred and uncontrollable.95
Such risks also raise serious equitable concerns, since they will be faced by especially
vulnerable people in poor nations.96 Along the dimensions identified by the psychometric
paradigm, climate change and terrorism might be expected to trigger roughly equivalent
public concern.
From the standpoint of the psychometric approach, it could not easily be predicted
that terrorism would trigger a greater reaction than terrorism. Indeed, the fact that the
risks associated with climate change are delayed, and likely to face future generations,
seems to reduce rather than to heighten public concern—a real problem for the
psychometric paradigm.
B. The Affect Heuristic
More recently, those interested in the psychometric paradigm have explored the
“affect heuristic”—a heuristic that is said to determine risk-related thoughts and
90

See id. at 99; for a discussion and critique, see Howard Margolis, Dealing With Risk (1997).
Slovic, supra note, at 143-44.
92
Id.
93
See id. at 143-52.
94
On public reactions to terrorist threats, with reference to the psychological literaturte, see Robert
Goodin, What’s Wrong With Terrorism? 123-36 (2005).
95
On some of the difficulties here, see Cass R. Sunstein, Risk and Reason 58-72 (2002).
96
See Thomas Schelling, Strategies of Commitment (2006).
91

14

behavior.97 On this view, people have rapid, immediate reactions to persons, activities,
and processes, and the immediate reaction operates as a mental short-cut for a more
deliberative or analytic assessment of the underlying issues.98 Much of this work
emphasizes the existence of two families of cognitive operations, sometimes described as
System I and System II, with which risky activities and processes are evaluated.99 System
I is rapid, intuitive, and error-prone; System II is more deliberative, calculative, slower,
and more likely to be error-free. Heuristic-based thinking is rooted in System I; it is
subject to override, under certain conditions, by System II.100 System I may, for example,
lead people to be fearful of flying, or of large dogs, but System II might create a
deliberative check, ensuring an eventual conclusion that the risks are trivial. So too,
System I might reflect little reason for concern about (say) sunbathing, but System II
might lead people to avoid undue exposure to the sun for fear of skin cancer.
Considerable evidence suggests that immediate affective reactions help to explain
people’s judgments about risks. When asked to assess the risks and benefits associated
with certain items, people tend to say that risky activities contain low benefits, and that
beneficial activities contain low risks.101 Hence it may well be that “affect” comes first,
and helps to direct judgments of both risk and benefit. In support of this hypothesis, note
that when subjects are asked to make their assessment under time pressure, the inverse
correlation between risks and benefits is increased—a finding that strongly suggests that
an affect heuristic, and System I, are at work.102 Consider also the fact that when people
learn about the low risks of an item, they are moved to think that the benefits are high—
and when they learn about the high benefits of an item, they are moved to think that the
risks are low.103 In these ways, judgments about risks can be connected with “the halo
effect,” which predicts that “the favorability of an overall impression an attitude object is
a good predictor of how strongly positive or negative qualities are ascribed to the
object.”104
Perhaps the affect heuristic explains the asymmetry between terrorism and climate
change. For many Americans, the idea of terrorism conjures up intense images of
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disaster, as the idea of climate change does not.105 In general, “many of the climate
change risks may not be as viscerally unsettling to people as one might think.”106 Even if
people were convinced that terrorism-related risks are not greater, as a statistical matter,
than those associated with climate change, their affective reactions to the former would
likely be far more intense than their affective reactions to the latter. The claim seems
right; the idea of terrorism typically does produce more intense emotions than the idea of
climate change. The problem is that this difference itself remains to be explained. Affect
is not simply given; it has sources. In this context, use of the affect heuristic appears to be
as much as redescription of different public reactions as an explanation of those
differences.
We could easily imagine a society, not unrecognizably different from our own, in
which the affect heuristic leads to much greater concern with climate change than with
terrorism, or at least equivalent concern. If events potentially related to climate change
were familiar and salient, and if events related to terrorism were not, the divergence in
reactions would run in a different direction. Indeed, there is no need to use our
imagination. Among some groups, climate change does produce extremely intense
concern, almost certainly equal to or greater than that associated with terrorism.107 Let us
now turn to this point, which offers a distinctive account of risk perception.
IV. Cultural Cognition
In a number of papers, Dan Kahan and his coauthors have drawn attention to
“cultural cognition”—to risk-related judgments that are a product of cultural orientations,
which serve as a kind of heuristic for more fine-grained judgments.108 On this
approach,109 people can be sorted into four groups: individualists, hierarchists,
egalitarians, and solidarists. Those who fall into the individualist camp tend to distrust
government regulation and to believe in free markets; hence they are unlikely to be
greatly concerned about climate change. The same is true of hierarchists, who favor the
established social order, and who reject efforts to disrupt it; controls on climate change
might well be seen as disruptive. By contrast, egalitarians are skeptical of businesses and
other institutions that are thought to produce large-scale inequalities in society;
egalitarians are sympathetic to environmental causes in general, and they are greatly
concerned about climate change.110 The same is true of solidarists, who believe that
human beings owe strong duties to one another, duties that environmental degradation
violates.
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Kahan and his coauthors claim to show that cultural cognition helps to explain
public reactions to numerous risks, including those associated with climate change.111
Egalitarians and solidarists are significantly more concerned about climate change than
are hierarchists and individualists. On this view, cultural dispositions operate as a kind of
heuristic for risk-related judgments.112 Indeed, Kahan and his coauthors contend that
cultural dispositions are a more accurate predictor of such judgments than party
identification and demographic characteristics such as race, religion, gender, and wealth.
In the context of climate change, they find, on the basis of survey evidence, that this is in
fact true.113 Certainly it can be demonstrated that political commitments are “clustered”;
those who believe that society has “become too soft and feminine,” or that government
“interferes too much in our daily lives,” are more likely to resist strong measures to
combat climate change.114 To this extent, there is a link between cultural dispositions and
views about climate change. In addition, cultural differences might well be associated
with different judgments about particular risk-reduction measures connected with
terrorism; the war in Iraq, for example, likely splits people along lines that are cultural in
the sense used by Kahan and his authors.
It is possible to go further. Some groups do consider climate change to be a more
serious threat than terrorism, and those groups appear to be identifiable along cultural
lines.115 My own small-scale survey at the University of Chicago Law School found that
most respondents did in fact consider climate change the more serious problem, by a
margin of 73% to 27%.116 As noted, most Americans do not agree.117 The University of
Chicago study did not test for cultural dispositions, but we can say, with a high degree of
confidence, that as compared with individualists and hierarchists, egalitarians and
solidarists are likely to rank the risks of climate change as equivalent to or higher than
those associated with terrorism.
But there are two problems with use of the idea of cultural cognition to explain
American reactions to climate change and terrorism. The first is that cultural divergences
have not been shown with respect to the latter risk, and those interested in cultural
cognition have not claimed to find cultural differences in the evaluation of terrorism.
Perhaps some such differences will be found in the future. But it would be most
surprising if one or another group showed little concern about terrorism-related risks, or
even if different groups showed significant variations in their level of concern. By
definition, the idea of cultural cognition is able to illuminate risk perceptions only for
those risks that are culturally contested, in the sense that relevant judgments diverge
across people who can be sorted into the relevant categories.118 For some risks, such as
those associated with lawnmowers, lightning, skiing, driving, flying, and hurricanes,
cultural dispositions ought not to be expected to play a significant role. Terrorism may
111

Id.
See Kahan and Braman, supra note.
113
See Kahan et al., Fear of Democracy, supra note.
114
Id.
115
See Leiserowitz, supra note.
116
Data on file with the author.
117
See notes supra.
118
See Cass R. Sunstein, Misfearing: A Reply, 19 Harv. L. Rev. 1110 (2006).
112

17

well fall in the same category, simply because the magnitude of public concern does not
diverge along identifiably cultural lines.119
The second problem has to do with the roots of cultural dispositions. As with the
affect heuristic, so too with cultural cognition, which involves a heuristic as well: A
reference to “culture” is an imperfect explanation, because culture too needs explanation.
Why, exactly, are individualists less concerned about climate change than are
egalitarians? What connects “culture” to risk perceptions? To make progress, it is
necessary to specify the mechanisms by which culture contributes to judgments about
risks. There are two principal possibilities.
1. Normative bias. Normative commitments often influence people’s judgments
about factual questions, as part of the general phenomenon of “biased assimilation.”120
Suppose that certain people believe that the depletion of the ozone layer is unlikely to be
a problem, and that the relevant fears are based on a form of hysteria and weak science. If
so, such people might be unlikely to credit new information suggesting that the fears are
legitimate. The general phenomenon—normative bias—is well-supported by evidence of
both biased assimilation and confirmation bias, by which people tend to seek out, and to
believe, evidence that supports their own antecedent views.121
As I am understanding it here, normative bias is an effort to reduce the cognitive
dissonance122 produced when preexisting normative commitments are in evident tension
with apparently relevant factual findings.123 If people with certain predispositions think
that climate change is not a serious problem, it may well be because of normative bias.
And if Americans are more severely split with respect to climate change than with respect
to terrorism, it is because normative commitments play a large role in assessing the
former than in assessing the latter. For terrorism, such commitments become relevant, not
for assessing the risk in general, but for contests over particular risk-reduction strategies,
such as the controversial surveillance by the National Security Agency, which can trigger
them.
2. Social influences. Suppose that people do not know whether climate change
causes serious risks. They are likely to form a judgment on the basis of what they learn
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from those they know and trust.124 If people sort themselves into different groups, with
different fears, then risk perceptions will diverge accordingly. People with incomplete
information are rationally interested in the views of those whom they trust. Those who
believe that climate change is a serious problem might so believe because they are
following the views of others.125 Note that the resulting differences may or may not
operate along geographical lines. If environmentalists are influenced by other
environmentalists, then their fears about climate change might have little to do with
physical location.
This understanding of cultural cognition emphasizes the role of social influences
on individual beliefs and actions. Such influences come in two forms: informational and
reputational.126 Suppose that trusted people believe that climate change is a serious
problem; if so, there is reason to believe that climate change imposes significant risks,
because that belief supplies valuable information. And if trusted or at least powerful
people so believe, there is reason to go along with them, simply in order to avoid
incurring their wrath; here is a reputational basis for following them. When people are
divided along certain lines, and when certain beliefs tend to “cluster,”127 it is typically
because of social influences. To the extent that beliefs about climate change are a product
of cultural cognition, social influences are the explanation.
Normative bias and social influences undoubtedly play a large role in judgments
about the relative priority of climate change and terrorism. It is easy to imagine social
groups that would regard climate change as having equal or higher priority; it is also easy
to imagine groups that would regard terrorism as self-evidently a far more serious
problem. But social influences and normative bias cannot be the whole story, and here is
a final problem for cultural accounts of risk perception. The problem of terrorism
occasioned far less concern on September 10, 2001 than it did on September 12 of the
same year; of course the explanation lies in the external shock of the 9/11 attacks. Indeed,
almost 50% of Americans described terrorism as the “most important problem facing the
country” immediately after the 9/11 attacks—an increase from zero the year before.128
When there is such an external shock, risk perceptions change dramatically across
cultural lines, and social influences and normative bias cannot provide an inadequate
account of those changes.129 In the environmental context, consider the legislation calling
for the Toxic Release Inventory, which was a clear product of a highly publicized
chemical accident at the Union Carbide plant in Bhopal, India in December 1984; the
accident “left more than 2,000 people dead and ignited a debate in the United States over
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the public’s right to know about chemicals at industrial plants.”130 Perhaps divergences in
concern can be explained partly by reference to cultural divisions, but the general
heightening of concern cannot possibly be explained in that fashion.
Or return to a change involving no external shock: Having shown some
ambivalence about efforts to control ozone-depleting chemicals, the United States
government firmly committed itself to the Montreal Protocol in 1987, and a reference to
social influences and normative bias cannot explain the shift.131 The commitment was
instead influenced by evidence that regulatory restrictions would be far less costly than
anticipated, and more beneficial as well.132 Of course political dynamics played a role,
with a weakened Reagan Administration showing some uneasiness about appearing
indifferent to an apparently serious environmental issue.133 But “culture cognition” does
not explain the national commitment. Cultural differences also fail to explain the
enactment of the acid deposition program as a key part of the Clean Air Act Amendments
of 1990; a crucial development was the rise of emissions trading mechanisms for
controlling acid deposition, because those mechanisms dramatically decreased the costs
of compliance.134 With respect to the government, at least, “cultural cognition,” and the
underlying mechanisms, cannot adequately account for American behavior, or the
divergence reactions to terrorism and climate change.
V. Benefits, Costs, and Rational Choice
If citizens are assumed to be rational, we might be able to make progress simply
by assuming that risk-related beliefs and conduct are a product of some kind of rational
weighing of benefits and costs. If citizens believe that they have much to gain and little to
lose from risk regulation, they will favor risk regulation; leaders respond to what citizens
believe, and their own judgments are influenced by cost-benefit analysis as well. Perhaps
the cost-benefit ratio is simply better for certain reductions of terrorist threats than for
aggressive efforts to reduce the risks associated with climate change. Note in this regard
that the United States ultimately supported the Montreal Protocol, and aggressive controls
on ozone-depleting chemicals, after a careful cost-benefit analysis suggested that the
costs of controls would be far lower than anticipated, and the benefits far higher.135 In the
words of a high-level participant in the proceedings: “A major break . . . came in the form
of a cost-benefit study from the President’s Council of Economic Advisers. The analysis
concluded that, despite the scientific and economic uncertainties, the monetary benefits
of preventing future deaths from skin cancer far outweighed the costs of CFC controls as
estimated either by industry or by EPA.”136
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If this example generalizes, an explanation of the divergence between terrorism
and climate change need not speak of psychometrics, affect, or culture. Rational selfinterest is enough. Of course many people believe that the United States has moral
obligations to poorer nations, which are distinctly threatened by climate change.137
Perhaps climate change is properly regarded as a kind of tort, committed by wealthy
agencies, above all the United States, against poor nations, who are in the weakest
position to adapt. But perhaps moral obligations are insufficient to motivate expensive
regulatory requirements. If so, those interested in imposing those requirements must
speak in other terms.138
A. Benefits
Americans might well believe that they have far more to gain from efforts to
reduce the risks of terrorism than from efforts to reduce the risks of climate change. To
be sure, much depends on the specific measures that are proposed. But the simplest claim
here would be that climate change is not yet occurring—or that if it is occurring, its
effects will not be significant in the United States. If we doubt the risk of serious harm,
we might well resist regulatory responses. Perhaps the best response to existing concerns
involves continued research, especially if little is to be gained by acting now rather than a
few years from now.139 With respect to terrorism, by contrast, it is difficult to say that the
risk is not real or that it is too speculative to warrant immediate action. To be sure,
particular risk-reduction strategies might be questioned—on the ground, for example, that
certain surveillance programs will not have significant effects, or that some steps increase
risks on balance. But it is hard to argue that with respect to terrorism, the best approach is
one of “learn, then act.”
Current evidence strongly suggests that Americans believe that they have
relatively little to gain from efforts to control climate change. In 2006, a large majority of
Americans suggested both that climate change is “already happening” and that climate
change does not pose a “serious threat” to them or their way of life in their lifetime.140 In
2006, another poll found that two-thirds of Americans believe that climate change will
not create a serious danger in their lifetime.141 In 2000, a sample of people was asked,
“Which of the following are you most concerned about? The impacts of climate change
on . . . 1) you and your family; 2) your local community; 3) the U.S. as a whole; 4)
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people are over the world; 5) non-human nature; or, 6) not at all concerned.”142 Nearly
70% of respondents answered 4) or 5), and only 13% answered 1) or 2). It is thus
apparent that Americans generally think that they are not themselves at risk as a result of
climate change.143 In their view, the principal risks are faced by those in other nations, or
by the environment in general.144 Thus the “health impacts of climate change have not
been portrayed effectively in the United States, leaving a motivational gap.”145
Compare in this regard a cross-national study of perceptions of risk associated
with terrorism.146 Americans estimated their personal chance of serious harm from
terrorism as 8.27%—to say the least, a significant risk.147 For obvious reasons, the
objective risks from terrorism are difficult to calculate, but the figure seems wildly
inflated. It is obvious that if each American does face a risk of 8.27%, aggressive
protective measures are certainly justified. Recall here the evidence that substantial
numbers of Americans are worried about the risk that a terrorist attack will affect
themselves, or their loved ones, in the near future.148
There is thus reason to believe that Americans think that they have far more to
gain from controls on terrorism than from controls on climate change, and that the
personal risk, to those now living, is much higher from terrorism than from climate
change. Some specialists offer supportive findings. For example, Nordhaus and Boyer
find that extremely little is lost by a ten-year delay in emissions reductions.149 Perhaps
this judgment is not correct. But even if it is wrong, doubts about the personal benefits of
climate change policies help to explain divergent public reactions. As I have emphasized,
legal initiatives are more likely if the citizenry is fearful; and Americans are far more
fearful of terrorism than they are of climate change. The pattern of regulation is a natural
product of this fact.
B. Costs
Perhaps those who show greater concern with terrorism are aware, at least
intuitively, that the costs of reducing climate change are likely to be very high—plausibly
higher than the costs of reducing the risk of terrorism. To be sure, such comparisons are
difficult in the abstract. Here as elsewhere, everything depends on the particular steps at
issue. The war in Iraq, motivated in large part by the risk of terrorism, has been extremely
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costly, easily exceeding $300 billion for the United States alone.150 As I have noted, the
cost of the Iraq War, to the United States, now exceeds the total expected cost of the
Kyoto Protocol, and before long the cost of Iraq War will dwarf that expected cost.151 At
the same time, it is possible to imagine steps to control greenhouse gases that would not
be terribly expensive.152 But perhaps significant reductions in the risk of terrorism can be
undertaken at reasonable cost, and perhaps the same is not true of climate change. On this
view, the divergent public reactions reflect a kind of informal cost-benefit analysis, in
accordance with which an awareness of the magnitude of the costs is doing a great deal of
work.
There is almost undoubtedly something to this explanation. If the risk of climate
change could be significantly reduced for $10 million, or with an annual tax increase of
$1 on every American, it is highly likely that much more would be done to combat
climate change. American enthusiasm for the Montreal Protocol is strong evidence on
this count.153 A demonstration that climate change could be reduced at low cost would
undoubtedly increase American enthusiasm for risk reduction efforts.154 To the extent
that the costs of risk reduction are “on screen,” less aggressive efforts will be made to
reduce risks.155 Note in this regard that in the abstract, Americans broadly support the
Kyoto Protocol and strong efforts to combat climate change—but their enthusiasm
sharply diminishes as they are asked to incur costs to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.156
In the context of terrorism, people may well believe that they are themselves unlikely to
incur significant costs, except, perhaps, in the form of increased waiting lines at airports.
Consider the recorded views of Americans about environmental protection and
climate change in the late 1990s. About 63 percent of Americans agreed with the
following statement: “Protecting the environment is so important that requirements and
standards cannot be too high and continuing environmental improvements must be made
regardless of cost.”157 In the same general vein, 59 percent supported the Kyoto Treaty on
climate change, with only 21 percent opposed.158 But in the same period, 52 percent of
Americans said that they would refuse to support the Kyoto Treaty if “it would cost an
extra $50 per month for an average American household.”159 In fact only 11 percent of
Americans would support the Kyoto Treaty if the monthly expense were $100 or more.160
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As I have noted, polls find that Americans are skeptical of increased energy and gasoline
taxes as efforts to reduce climate change—though they also favor regulatory mandates on
power companies.161 How can we explain strong majority support for “environmental
improvements . . . regardless of cost” and strong majority rejection of environmental
improvements when the cost is high?
The answer lies in the fact that people are not, in fact, willing to spend an infinite
amount for environmental improvements. When the costs are squarely placed “on
screen,” people begin to weigh both costs and benefits, and their enthusiasm for
regulatory expenditures diminishes.162 Hence Americans believe that car companies
should be required to take steps to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, without also being
willing to spend a great deal, if anything, in increased gasoline prices.163 Surveys in
Europe suggests that significant numbers of citizens are willing to pay a considerable
amount to reduce the risks of climate change; but even there, the amount is not extremely
high.164 Among all people between the age of 15 and 64, only about 20% are willing to
pay more for gasoline to reduce environmental harm, and among that group, the average
willingness to pay is an increase of 2.4%, or 11.5 cents per liter.165 For citizens as well as
leaders, an intuitive assessment of costs and benefits plays a large role in determining the
level of precautions actually sought.
Consider in this regard a study done at the Wharton School, which projected
extremely high costs for the United States from the Kyoto Protocol166—including a loss
of 2.4 million jobs and $300 billion in the nation’s GDP, with an average annual cost of
$2700 per household, including a 65 cent per gallon increase in the price of gasoline and
a near-doubling of the price of energy and electricity. These numbers are almost certainly
inflated, especially in light of the technological innovations that would undoubtedly drive
expenses down.167 But if significant costs are to be expected, significant regulation is less
likely. Return here to the government’s decision, in the 1990 Clean Air Act, to take
extremely aggressive steps to control acid deposition.168 Those steps became possible
only after the creation of an ambitious emissions trading program reduced the anticipated
costs of emissions controls; hence those who would otherwise be inclined to oppose the
program found it acceptable.169 We saw a similar pattern with American enthusiasm for
steps to decrease depletion of the ozone layer.170
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C. American Costs, Foreign Benefits
The most serious damage from climate change is not expected to be felt in the
United States.171 On some estimates, American agriculture will actually be a net winner
as a result of climate change.172 On other estimates, Americans as a whole will be net
losers, but not nearly to the same extent as other nations.173 The estimates fit public
perceptions, for Americans believe that other nations have more to lose from climate
change than the United States does.174 Here there is a significant difference between the
problem of climate change and the problem of ozone depletion, where the United States
had a great deal to gain, in terms of health benefits, from both immediate and long-term
action.175 American behavior is likely to be much affected by any finding that citizens in
other nations have much more to gain from regulatory protection than Americans do.
Consider the fact that a “revealed preference” study of American laws suggests that a
non-American life is valued at 1/2000 an American life.176 If Americans believe that
people in India and South Africa, rather than Florida and New York, are at serious risk,
they will be far less likely to act.
The most systematic analyses suggest that the United States stands to lose much
more, and to gain much less, from aggressive regulation than European nations do. For
the United States, the likely costs of the Kyoto Protocol, for example, seem to exceed its
likely benefits, with a total cost of $325 billion.177 The picture for the world as a whole is
far more mixed, with Europe anticipated to be a net gainer, and with Russia likely to gain
an especially large amount.178 Hence those nations that favor aggressive controls on
greenhouse gases, and that have shown enthusiasm for the Kyoto Protocol, are
responding in large part to the fact that they are anticipated to gain a great deal and to
spend relatively little. Indeed, almost all Eastern European nations have easily met their
obligations under the Kyoto Protocol, in large part because their emissions allowances
greatly exceeded their likely emissions in any case.179 When the costs are so low,
regulation will seem attractive if the risks of climate change are even mildly available to
171
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leaders and citizens. Recall here the clear finding that Americans do not believe that they
personally have much if anything to lose from climate change.180
At the present time, many people believe that the United States will be able to
handle the costs of climate change,181 and hence that expensive precautions are hard to
justify simply from the standpoint of national self-interest. If this is so, then intuitive
cost-benefit balancing is the source of the official position of the United States; it also
helps to explain Europe’s greater willingness to engage in precautionary measures. For
the United States, the key point is that aggressive regulation seems to be a kind of foreign
aid program, one that is not self-evidently in national self-interest.182 As we have seen,
controls on ozone depletion were very different on that count, because the domestic costbenefit ratio easily favored such controls.183 Of course the problem of terrorism is not
comparable to climate change on this count. While efforts to control terrorism are likely
to benefit other nations, the principal goal is to protect the United States itself.
D. Present Costs, Future Benefits
Perhaps the real difference lies in the temporal incidence of costs and benefits.184
Consider the following question: "Do you think climate change is an urgent problem that
requires immediate government action, or a longer-term problem that requires more study
before government action is taken?” Many more Americans believe that the problem is
“longer-term” than “urgent.”185
For climate change, it is reasonable to believe that the largest costs of risk
reduction will be felt immediately, whereas the benefits will be received mostly by those
in the future.186 Whatever their stated moral commitments, and whatever the
psychometric paradigm may say, current citizens are usually unwilling to pay a great deal
to help those who will follow them. Perhaps current citizens are rationally discounting the
future, believing that harms in fifty years do not deserve the same attention as harms
today.187 Perhaps citizens are assuming that if risks will not be incurred for many
decades, they might not be incurred at all, simply because technological advances will
provide a solution. Perhaps they are using an implausibly high discount rate to assess
future benefits.188 Perhaps they are being unrealistically optimistic, or reducing cognitive
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dissonance,189 believing that a probabilistic harm in the future will not come to fruition at
all, or will not be particularly bad if it does. Or they might be simply self-interested,
treating future generations as a kind of foreign country. Thomas Schelling argues that
“[g]reenhouse gas abatement is a foreign aid program, not a saving-investment problem
of the familiar kind.”190 And if political actors are responsive to their citizens, it is most
unlikely that they will impose high current costs for long-term gains. By the time the
largest benefits of risk-reduction are generally felt by the public, those politicians will be
out of office and indeed long dead.
Here, then, is a substantial difference between the risk of terrorism and the risk of
climate change. Every politician has a strong incentive to take steps to prevent terrorist
attacks. If such an attack occurs “on his watch,” the likelihood of political reprisal is high.
The risk of such an attack is immediate. By contrast, it is far less likely that there will be
a climate change “incident” on the watch of, or easily attributable to, any current
politician.191 To justify public concern, or the imposition of immediate costs, such a
politician must trigger moral commitments, which may not be so easy to do.192 If moral
commitments do not operate as an impetus for costly controls, a politician who attempts
to regulate greenhouse gases might be imposing costs on current voters for the benefit of
future people who will never be able to reward that particular politician with their
electoral support. Such politicians might well be heroic; but it might well be surprising to
see heroes of that particular sort.
E. Rational Choice? A Summary and Some Doubts
If the various parts of the analysis are taken as a whole, we seem to have the
ingredients of a plausible explanation of the divergent American reactions to terrorism
and climate change. With respect to climate change, the benefits of aggressive regulation
are disputed and the costs are plausibly high, certainly for the United States. The benefits
are likely to be enjoyed disproportionately by other nations and in the fairly distant
future. The analysis is very different for terrorism, where Americans perceive themselves
as peculiarly at risk, and hence the benefits of risk reduction will be felt in the United
States and by current generations. For many efforts to reduce the risk of terrorism, it is
possible to question whether the benefits justify the costs; but the judgment, intuitive or
more reflective, is that many expensive measures are worthwhile.
To this extent, an account based on rational choice stands on firm ground. Those
who emphasize bounded rationality do not urge that people are irrational, or that they
refuse to attend to consequences. But recall that on September 10, 2001, terrorism was far
from a high-priority item for Americans—and that the year before the attacks, literally
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zero percent of the public counted terrorism as the nation’s leading problem.193 By
contrast, many specialists believed, for a period preceding the attack, that the risk of
terrorism was foolishly neglected in light of a rational assessment of costs and benefits—
and hence that the attacks were a kind of “predictable surprise.”194 On this view, the
neglect was a product of “unavailability bias,” in which the absence of cognitively
available incidents of harm made people unreasonably indifferent to the risk.195 Note in
this regard that in the eighteen months following the 9/11 attacks, terrorism continued to
be named the nation’s most important problem by between 15 and 20 percent of those
polled—and that the “fluctuations closely track[ed] the frequency of television news
stories concerning terrorism.”196 Here, too, is a tribute to the power of the availability
heuristic.
Perhaps the post-9/11 reaction is simply a form of rational updating on the part of
Americans; committed believers in rational choice would so consist, believing that the
aggressive regulatory steps, after 9/11, generally reflected the (massive) new information
provided by the attacks themselves. With respect to ordinary citizens, this account is not
implausible. But as an explanation of the behavior of the United States, much more was
almost certainly involved, because officials had the information to justify more
aggressive security measures well before 9/11.197 To understand the missing ingredients,
it is necessary to venture well beyond an account based solely on rational choice.
VI. Behavioral Economics
It would certainly be optimistic to suppose that risk perception, and American risk
regulation, is generally a product of rational (whether or not selfish) balancing of costs
and benefits.198 With respect to terrorism, vivid and concrete images play a large role in
people’s judgments. Climate change is entirely different. According to a recent study,
“most Americans lacked vivid, concrete, and personally-relevant affective images of
climate change, which helps explain why climate change remains a low priority national
or environmental issue.”199 This finding provides an important clue to risk perception in
general; it also casts a distinctive light on the divergent American reactions to terrorism
and climate change.
A. The Availability Heuristic
1. Availability in general. It is well-established that in thinking about risks, people
rely on certain heuristics, or rules of thumb, which serve to simplify their inquiry.200
Heuristics typically work through a process of “attribute substitution,” in which people
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answer a hard question by substituting an easier one.201 Should Americans be fearful of
hurricanes, nuclear power, mad cow disease, alligator attacks, or avian flu? When people
use the availability heuristic, they assess the magnitude of risks by asking whether
examples can readily come to mind.202 For example, “a class whose instances are easily
retrieved will appear more numerous than a class of equal frequency whose instances are
less retrievable.”203 If people can easily think of relevant examples, they are far more
likely to be frightened and concerned than if they cannot. Consider a simple study
showing people a list of well-known people of both sexes, and asking them whether the
list contains more names of women or more names of men. In lists in which the men were
especially famous, people thought that they were more names of men, whereas in lists in
which the women were the more famous, people thought that there were more names of
women.204
This is a point about how familiarity can affect the availability of instances. A risk
that is familiar, like that associated with terrorism in the aftermath of 9/11, will be seen as
more serious than a risk that is less familiar, like that associated with sunbathing or hotter
summers. But salience is important as well. “For example, the impact of seeing a house
burning on the subjective probability of such accidents is probably greater than the
impact of reading about a fire in the local paper.”205 Thus vivid and easily imagined
causes of death (e.g., tornadoes) receive likelihood estimates that are similar to those of
less-vivid causes (e.g., asthma attacks) that occur with a far greater frequency (here a
factor of 20).206 So too, recent events will have a greater impact than earlier ones. The
point helps explain differences across time and space in much risk-related behavior,
including both public and private decisions to take precautions. If floods have not
occurred in the immediate past, people who live on flood plains are far less likely to
purchase insurance.207 Whether people will buy insurance for natural disasters is greatly
affected by recent experiences.208 In the aftermath of an earthquake, insurance for
earthquakes rises sharply—but it declines steadily from that point, as vivid memories
recede. 209
The importance of the availability heuristic emerges from a cross-national study
of perceptions of risk associated with terrorism and SARS.210 Americans perceived
terrorism to be a far greater threat, to themselves and to others, than SARS; Canadians
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perceived SARS to be a greater threat, to themselves and to others, than terrorism.211
These findings are understandable in light of the fact that Canadians have experienced no
incidents of terrorism but a significant number of cases of SARS—whereas Americans
have experienced a serious terrorist attack but no cases of SARS. Note that the use of the
availability heuristic, in these contexts, is hardly irrational.212 What has happened before
seems, much of the time, to be the best available guide to what will happen again. The
problem is that the availability heuristic can lead to significant errors, in terms of both
excessive fear and neglect; the problem of neglect is especially serious when citizens face
a potentially catastrophic low probability risk that has not come to fruition in the recent
past.213
What, in particular, produces availability? An illuminating essay, with important
implications for divergent reactions to terrorism and climate change, attempts to test the
effects of ease of imagery on perceived judgments of risk.214 The study asked subjects to
read about an illness (Hyposcenia-B) that “was becoming increasingly prevalent” on the
local campus. In one condition, the symptoms were vague and hard to imagine, involving
an inflamed liver, a malfunctioning nervous system, and a general sense of disorientation.
In another condition, the symptoms were concrete and easy to imagine—involving
muscle aches, low energy, and frequent severe headaches. Subjects in both conditions
were asked to imagine a three-week period in which they had the disease and to write a
detailed description of what they imagined. After doing so, subjects were asked to assess,
on a ten-point scale, their likelihood of contracting the disease. The basic finding was that
likelihood judgments were very different in the two conditions, with easily-imagined
symptoms making people far more inclined to believe that they were likely to get the
disease.
2. Availability, terrorism, and climate change. If the availability heuristic plays a
large role in people’s risk-related judgments, then we might have a simple explanation for
the asymmetry in American reactions: Because of the attacks of 9/11, an available
incident drives people’s probability judgments with respect to terrorism, whereas there is
no such incident with respect to climate change. The vividness and salience of the
incident helps to ensure continuing concern about terrorism-related risks. To see the
point, consider what would happen if in 2000, a candidate for public office had made the
risk of terrorism a central issue in a political campaign. Such a candidate would likely
211
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have seemed to have an odd sense of priorities—focusing on a distant and apparently
unrealistic threat, one that could not possibly have resonated in the minds of voters. Or
suppose that in 2000, a member of Congress had aggressively argued for much of the
same legislation that followed the attacks of 9/11, including increased security measures
at airports and new presidential authority to ferret out suspected terrorists. There is no
question that Congress would have rejected any such effort; indeed, a legislator who
argued for it would probably have seemed to be an alarmist and a threat to civil liberties.
In 2000, the public was no more focused on terrorism-related risks than on the risks
associated with climate change. The attacks of 9/11 made all the difference.
The point is quite general. Risk-reduction legislation is often fueled by
identifiable crises. Legislation calling for disclosure of toxic releases was spurred by a
chemical accident at Bhopal, India, which focused “media attention on chemical safety”
and led members of Congress to “introduce right-to-know legislation.”215 The relevant
legislation could not possibly have been enacted without the highly publicized Bhopal
disaster.216 Corporate Fuel Economy Standards, requiring fuel economy for motor
vehicles, were a product of the Arab oil embargo and the nationally publicized “energy
crisis”; without the crisis, the fuel economy legislation would have been unimaginable.217
Often the available incidents are a product of presentations by influential actors. Silent
Spring, by Rachel Carson,218 almost certainly helped to spur national controls on
pesticides and indeed the environmental movement and other legislation as well. Indeed,
Carson’s book, with its vivid narratives of harm-producing activities, may well have
played a role in the creation of the Environmental Protection Agency.219 The point is that
Carson did not offer a dry analysis of the costs and benefits of pesticides; it made certain
events highly salient to its readers.
Availability affects public perceptions as well. Within the United States, public
concern about risks usually tracks changes in the actual fluctuations in those risks. But
public concern outruns actual fluctuations in the important case of “panics,” bred by vivid
illustrations that do not reflect changes in levels of danger.220 At certain points in the
1970s and 1980s, there were extreme leaps in concern about teenage suicides, herpes,
illegitimacy, and AIDS—leaps that did not correspond to changes in the size of the
problem. Availability, produced by “a particularly vivid case or new finding that receives
considerable media attention,” played a major role in those leaps in public concern.221 In
2006, three incidents of alligator attacks led citizens of Florida to be “suddenly
hypervigilant to a danger that seemed to be lurking in every body of freshwater bigger
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than a bathtub. Calls to hotlines skyrocketed, and all over the state people were asking
themselves what could possibly be going on.”222 With terrorism, it is difficult to know
whether the response to the 9/11 attacks has been excessive, insufficient, or optimal. But
there is no doubt that it was a function of a highly salient event.
With respect to the operation of the availability heuristic, leaders in the private
and public spheres can have a significant impact. By its very nature, the voice of an
influential politician comes with amplifiers. When public officials bring an incident
before the public, a seemingly illustrative example is likely to spread far and wide.
Because of the magnitude of the harm, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 would
inevitably loom large no matter what President George W. Bush chose to emphasize.223
But the President, and his White House generally, referred to the attacks on countless
occasions, frequently as a way of emphasizing the reality of seemingly distant threats and
the need to incur significant costs to counteract them (including the 2003 Iraq war, itself
fueled by presidential speeches including vivid narratives of catastrophic harm).
President Bush was certainly able to invoke salience on behalf of the Iraq war, offering a
vivid picture of the risks of inaction in his 2003 State of the Union Address: “Imagine
those 19 hijackers [involved in the 9/11 attacks] with other weapons and plans, this time
armed by Saddam Hussein. It would take one vial, one canister, one crate slipped into this
country to bring a day of horror like none we have ever known.”224 And indeed, President
Bush had a general incentive to invoke the 9/11 attacks: A reminder of those attacks lead
people to show stronger support for him—and the increase in support occurred among
those inclined against him as well as those inclined in his favor.225
With climate change, by contrast, no salient incident triggers public concern.
Notwithstanding efforts to link Hurricane Katrina with climate change,226 the evidence is
contested and disputable, and Americans did not conclude that the hurricane was in any
sense “caused” by climate change. If a salient incident does occur, the likelihood of an
American response would dramatically increase. As we have seen in connection with the
acid deposition program and controls on ozone-depleting chemicals, no such incident is
necessary. But unless it occurs, a clear demonstration, or at least perception, of a
favorable cost-benefit ratio will likely be necessary to spur regulation.
B. Probability Neglect
As a result of the availability heuristic, people can offer an inaccurate assessment of
probability. But sometimes people will attempt little assessment of probability at all,
especially when strong emotions are involved. In such cases, large-scale variations in
probabilities will matter little—even when those variations unquestionably should matter
a great deal. What matters is the outcome, not the likelihood that it will occur. The point
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applies to hope as well as fear; vivid images of good outcomes will crowd out
consideration of probability too. Lotteries are successful partly for this reason. Consider
also these findings:






When people discuss a low-probability risk, their concern rises even if the
discussion consists mostly of apparently trustworthy assurances that the
likelihood of harm really is infinitesimal.227
If people are asked how much they will pay for flight insurance for losses
resulting from “terrorism,” they will pay more than if they are asked how much
they will pay for flight insurance from all causes.228
People show ”alarmist bias.” When presented with competing accounts of
danger, they tend to move toward the more alarming account.229
Visualization or imagery matters a great deal to people’s reactions to risks. When
an image of a bad outcome is easily accessible, people will become greatly
concerned about a risk, holding probability constant.230
If the potential outcome of a gamble has a great deal of associated affect (a kiss
with a favorite movie star, an electric shock), its attractiveness or
unattractiveness is remarkably insensitive to changes in probability, even
changes as large as from .99 to .01.231

Probability neglect provides a great deal of help in understanding the divergent
American reactions to terrorism and climate change. With respect to terrorism, there is an
intense, often highly visual reaction to bad outcomes—a reaction that can easily crowd
out judgments about probability. The same is not true of climate change. To be sure, there
is nothing intrinsic to the relevant risk that justifies this state of affairs. As I have noted,
some people urged that the devastation of Hurricane Katrina had a great deal to do with
climate change,232 and it is easy to imagine a successful effort to suggest that catastrophic
events were caused, or increased in intensity, by virtue of climate change. If so,
probability neglect might spur increased regulatory controls on greenhouse gas
emissions. At the present time, however, the American public does not connect climate
change with particular bad outcomes, and the absence of aggressive regulation is best
understood in light of that fact.
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C. An Identifiable Perpetrator: The Goldstein Effect and Outrage
In George Orwell’s 1984, political leaders focus public attention on Emmanuel
Goldstein, a former member of the Party who became its despised enemy.233 In Orwell’s
narrative, the Party made Goldstein the outlet and the occasion for public fear and
outrage, even when the ultimate source of that fear, and that outrage, were more plausibly
a product of failures of the regime. Osama Bin Laden was never a friend to the United
States or a member of any of its parties, and to say the least, he is a genuine enemy. But
there can be little doubt that the war on terror has been spurred by what we might call the
Goldstein Effect: the ability to intensify public concern by giving a definite face to the
adversary, identifying a human source of the underlying threat and a person to be blamed
for it.234
Of course the risk of terrorism triggers intense outrage, whatever the magnitude of
the risk; and when outrage is triggered, the public is likely to respond far more than it
otherwise would.235 But if terrorism can be associated with a particular person or group,
the response will be increased. This approach has generally succeeded with Osama Bin
Laden. It was also successful with the attack on Iraq in 2003, as Saddam Hussein became
a casualty of the Goldstein Effect. (To make these claims, it is of course unnecessary to
question the demonization of Osama Bin Laden and Saddam Hussein; those who are
demonized may actually be demons.)
There is no analogue in the context of climate change. Warmer temperatures are a
product not of an identifiable perpetrator or any human face, but of the interaction
between nature and countless decisions by countless actors in the private and public
domains. To the extent that nature is responsible, or perceived as responsible, public
concern is dampened. It has been found that “[h]uman intervention seems to be an
amplifier in judgments on food riskiness and contamination,” even though “more lives
are lost to natural than to man-made disasters in the world.”236 Studies show that people
overestimate the carcinogenic risk from pesticides and underestimate the risks of natural
carcinogens. People also believe that nature implies safety, so much that they will prefer
natural water to processed water even if the two are chemically identical.237 If nature or
put to one side, contributors to climate change include not merely numerous companies in
the United States and around the world, but each of us, through our daily activities and
consumption. There are no obvious devils or demons here—no human beings who
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actually intend to produce the harms associated with climate change.238 In the context of
terrorism, a “we-they” narrative fits the facts; in the context of climate change, those who
are the solution might well also be, or seem to be, the problem. In these circumstances,
public outrage is much harder to fuel, and those concerned with climate change cannot
easily take advantage of the Goldstein Effect.
Those who are so concerned might try, and indeed have tried, to use the Goldstein
Effect against American leaders, most obviously President George W. Bush, perhaps
charging him with negligence or even recklessness.239 And in fact, President Bush’s
decision to reject the Kyoto Protocol in 2001 “produced a very strong negative reaction
internationally, especially in Europe,” and “the citizens of Europe and their leaders were
outraged.”240 But no one can claim that President Bush has actually sought to bring about
climate change, and hence it is difficult to produce the level of outrage associated with
Osama Bin Laden. In the next decades, it might be possible to enlist the Goldstein Effect
against India and China, which are likely to be large contributors to climate change.241
But nations lack faces.
More generally, a great deal of evidence suggests the pervasive importance of
outrage to people’s reactions to risk. Several studies test this question with the hypothesis
that certain low-probability risks, such as those associated with nuclear waste radiation,
produce outrage, whereas other low-probability risks, such as those associated with radon
exposure, do not. The most striking finding is that even when the risk was identical in the
nuclear waste (high outrage) and radon (low outrage) cases, people in the nuclear waste
case reported a much greater perceived threat and a much higher intention to act to
reduce that threat.242 Indeed, “the effect of outrage was practically as large as the effect of
a 4000-fold difference in risk between the high-risk and low-risk conditions.”243 Efforts to
communicate the meaning of differences in risk levels, by showing comparisons to
normal risk levels, reduced the effect of outrage, but even after those efforts, outrage had
nearly the same effect as a 2000-fold increase in risk.244 Outrage almost certainly
contributed to “right-to-know” legislation involving chemical releases.245 Terrorism is a
high-outrage threat, indeed it may be the highest-outrage threat, and hence the public
response is likely to be far more intense than the corresponding response to climate
change, which does not produce anything like the same level of outrage.
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The behavioral conclusions, then, are that outrage plays a large role in people’s
judgments about risks; that outrage increases the intention to respond to risk; and that the
Goldstein Effect contribute to outrage. These points help to explain the divergent
American reactions to terrorism and climate change. Of course outrage is a social and
cultural product, and not a brute fact. It would be possible for officials to heighten or to
reduce outrage in either domain. In particular, those concerned about the risks associated
with climate change might well be able to increase outrage by identifying the leading
contributors to climate change and suggesting that with certain steps, they can
significantly reduce the relevant risks.
D. Myopia, Optimism, and Fairness
Many people believe that climate change has already imposed significant costs,
including significant numbers of deaths, perhaps as many as 150,000 each year246; but the
most serious risks are long-term.247 This is so for the United States as for other nations.
Americans appear to understand this point; as we have seen, they believe that the risks
will be felt by future generations rather than those now living. It is also clear that this
point affects people’s willingness to support expensive precautions. From the standard
point of view, there is no problem here. People rationally discount the future, and costs in
one hundred years should not be treated the same as the same costs today.248 Apart from
discounting, it is possible that because of technological advances, those costs will not be
incurred at all. On the basis of the data alone, we might be willing to conclude that
insofar as time matters, the divergent reactions to the risks of terrorism and climate
change are a product of standard accounts of rationality.
But something is missing from this optimistic account. Behavioral economists
have emphasized that people often engage in “hyperbolic discounting”; they discount the
future at an implausibly high rate, demonstrating a form of myopia that reflects bounded
rationality.249 At the level of individual behavior, the result can be self-control problems
that greatly undermine people’s well-being.250 Analogous problems emerge in the
political domain. A recent survey demonstrates that with respect to water quality
improvements, people show extreme time preferences, greatly favoring current
improvements over significantly more beneficial improvement merely two years later.251
The conclusion is that “there is evidence of a substantial under-evaluation of deferred
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benefits, which in effect receive a weight of about 50-60 percent of their correct
discounted value.”252
It is reasonable to think that a similar form of under-evaluation affects people’s
beliefs and behavior with respect to climate change. The problem is likely to be
compounded by the presence of optimistic bias, by which people tend to show an
unrealistic belief in their own immunity from certain risks.253 At least when a risk will not
be faced for the distant future, and when no available incident heightens concern,
optimistic bias can result in little concern about long-term risks.
Myopia and optimism to one side, the evidence thus far suggests that American
belief and behavior reflects American self-interest. With respect to depletion of the ozone
layer, the assessment of costs and benefits suggested that Americans had more to gain
than to lose, a point that was supplemented by the convenient fact that American
companies were in the forefront of innovation with respect to the development of ozonedepleting chemicals.254 It is unnecessary to speak in behavioral terms to say that selfinterest helps to account for the greater focus on terrorism than on climate change. On the
contrary, behavioralists emphasize that people care about fairness, and are sometimes
willing to sacrifice their material self-interest in order to be fair or (especially) in order to
punish unfairness.255
Nonetheless, there are two behavioral points here, both of which bear directly on
American reactions to climate change. The first is that while people care about fairness,
their judgments about fairness are systematically biased in their own direction—a finding
that helps to explain litigation behavior, including failures to settle.256 In the context of
climate change, the prediction is that fairness-related judgments, on the part of both rich
and poor countries, will be self-serving, in a way that will affect international
negotiations.257 The United States is therefore unlikely to believe that fairness require
substantial sacrifices on its part, purely for the sake of other nations. The second point is
that when people are willing to sacrifice material self-interest for the sake of fairness, it is
often because they anticipate that their own unfairness will be punished.258 In the context
of climate change, Americans have little reason to believe that other nations, and in
particular poor nations, will be willing or able to punish the United States for refusing to
enter into international agreements, or for refusing to do so on advantageous terms.
Here as well the problem of ozone depletion had a very different character,
because developing countries could credibly threaten to hold out, and thus threaten to
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inflict serious risks of skin cancer and cataracts on American citizens. This credible threat
helped to lead wealthy nations, including the United States, to offer financial
inducements to poor nations in order to ensure their participation.259 In 1990, the original
treaty was amended to compensate developing countries for their expense, and hundreds
of millions of dollars were pledged to that effect for the first several years, producing a
total of $1.22 billion by 2001.260 In the context of climate change, the problem is that
even if Americans are willing to sacrifice their self-interest for the sake of those
elsewhere, they will be unwilling to spend large sums of money to do so unless their
unwillingness to do so can be punished. Perhaps China and India will ultimately prove
able to threaten punishment, in the form of continued growth in greenhouse gas
emissions, if the United States does not pay for their reductions. But it is unclear, to say
the least, that the most vulnerable nations can threaten the United States if it refuses to
reduce its own greenhouse gas emissions.

E. Boundedly Rational Risk Perception
The behavioral account, and indeed the exploration of the four approaches to risk
perceptions, are now complete. Those who emphasize the availability heuristic,
probability neglect, outrage, myopia, optimism, and self-interested judgments about
fairness do not contend that risk perception and risk-related behavior are “irrational”;
instead they stress the role of mental short-cuts and emotions in heightening or
dampening people’s judgments about risk. Those who suffer from bounded rationality do
care about both costs and benefits, but their assessment of these is affected by heuristics
and biases, in a way that can lead to severe and systematic errors. If the argument thus far
is correct, bounded rationality provides the best and most complete account of the
divergent American reactions to terrorism and climate change.
1. A problem. There is an evident difficulty with this argument: It is exceedingly
difficult to contend that anyone is making “errors” here. We might be tempted to think
that because of availability bias, the risk of terrorist attacks is inflated; we might similarly
think that because of unavailability bias, the risks associated with climate change are
underestimated. But there is no universally accepted benchmark from which to make
these judgments. With respect to terrorism, the questions of probability are too uncertain
to justify a conclusion that Americans are excessively fearful; a “best estimate” of 300
terrorism-related deaths in, say, the next year261 may turn out to be too high or too low,
but no clear evidence justifies any such judgment, in the present year, that this estimate is
optimistic or pessimistic. In retrospect, some of the terrorism-related probability
judgments of Americans in 2003 did seem inflated,262 but this is not an area in which
availability is clearly leading to excessive fear. With climate change, it is also difficult to
say that Americans are underestimating the current risks. Perhaps they are doing too little
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to respond to those risks, but existing evidence does not justify a confident conclusion
that their perception of risk is too low.263
What can be said, then, is not that there are any clear errors, but that the
behavioral factors—availability, probability neglect, and outrage in particular—help to
explain the divergent American reactions to terrorism and climate change, and that a
purely rational account is to that extent incomplete. Of course it is possible to insist that
the United States has operated sensibly on the basis of available information; that the
events of 9/11 supplied valuable information; and that the risks of climate change are, on
the basis of available information, insufficient to justify more aggressive controls. But
this account is insufficiently sensitive to what is generally known about risk perception,
and it disregards the fact that the behavioral factors would predict exactly the divergence
that we observe. Of course boundedly rational people are attentive to the costs and
benefits of risk regulation. The problem is that their assessments of the relevant factors
are affected by behavioral influences.
2. Prescription. It is for this reason that in the United States, national leaders are
under little pressure to attempt to reduce the risks associated with climate change. Of
course such leaders have considerable room to maneuver. So long as Americans are not
greatly affected in economic or other terms, real steps to reduce greenhouse gases would
be publicly acceptable. But if leaders believe that the argument for such steps is weak, we
would not expect them to be forthcoming. Let us suppose that the American government
should, in principle, be doing much more to control greenhouse gas emissions.264 How
might it be encouraged to do so?
1. Costs. The easiest way would be to attempt to replicate the success of efforts to
combat depletion of the ozone layer—by showing that the costs of reduction efforts
would be far lower than feared. The magnitude of those costs is of course an empirical
question. But as I have emphasized, the replacement of ozone-depleting chemicals turned
out to be far less expensive than originally anticipated, and the unexpectedly low costs
helped to spur American enthusiasm for international restrictions.265 In sharp contrast to
climate change, the American public was willing to support steps to protect the ozone
layer, while the European public was indifferent or even opposed to such steps.266
On the cost side, everything depends on technological innovations. Technologyforcing has proved successful in many domains. If the costs of reducing greenhouse gas
263

For evidence of sensible risk perceptions, see W. Kip Viscusi and Richard Zeckhauser, The
Perception and Valuation of the Risks of Climate Change: A Rational and Behavioral Blend (2005),
available on ssrn.com
264
See, e.g.., Daniel Abbasi, supra note; Posner, supra note; Robert Stavins, Can An Effective Global
Climate Treaty Be Based on Sound Science, Rational Economics, and Pragmatic Politics (unpublished
manuscript 2005); Richard B. Stewart & Jonathan B. Wiener, Reconstructing Climate Policy (2003); Sheila
Olmstead and Robert Stavins, An International Policy Architecture for the Post-Kyoto Era (unpublished
manuscript 2006). A valuable set of perspectives can be found in Kyoto and Beyond: Alternative
Approaches to Global Warming, 96 Am Econ Rev 22 (2006).
265
See the account in Robert Percival et al., Environmental Regulation 1049-1051 (4d ed. 2003).
266
Id. at 1050.

39

emissions remain high, aggressive action is unlikely. But if it is possible to force
technological innovation with respect to greenhouse gases, the American posture would
surely shift, perhaps dramatically.
2. Benefits. A second way to affect American attitudes would operate on the
benefit side. If the United States actually had, and believed that it had, a great deal to lose
from climate change, and in the immediate future rather than the long-run, more costly
regulation would be anticipated.267 Here we might replicate the experience not of the
Montreal Protocol but of the acid deposition program of the Clean Air Act, which was
spurred in part by new evidence of the risks associated with acid deposition.268 No salient
incident lay behind the acid deposition program. A clearer appreciation of the risks of
climate change would undoubtedly affect American attitudes.269 But for purposes of
understanding public perceptions, it is important to underline the potential role of vivid
images of harm. Such images, introduced by a salient incident, can have large effects on
legislative initiatives270; and if there is anything like a kind of 9/11 for climate change,
aggressive measures might well be anticipated.
I have emphasized the role of leaders in the private and public sector; public
beliefs and desires are endogenous to their claims, and hence the salience of 9/11, and the
continuing sense of fear, had a great deal to do with the statements and actions of
President Bush.271 In 2004, the White House released a fact sheet on the war on terror,
starting with a quotation form President Bush: “[W]e’re still not safe. . . . We are a
Nation in danger.”272 By contrast, Prime Minister Tony Blair argued that there is “no
bigger long-term question facing the global community” than the threat of climate
change, and that “Climate change is the most important issue facing the world today.”273
Because of the fact of 9/11, and because serious efforts to control climate change would
inevitably impose high costs on the United States, any American official will have
limited ability to shift the public’s current levels of concern. But there is no question that
fear of terrorist attacks can be heightened or diminished274—and that it would be possible
to increase the salience and hence the level of concern about the risks associated with
climate change, and hence to magnify the public demand for a regulatory response.
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3. Costs and benefits: a final comparison. I have offered a number of comparisons
between the problem of ozone depletion and that of climate change, and it may be useful
to conclude by offering a more systematic comparison. In 1988, the Environmental
Protection Agency offered the following account of the costs and benefits of the Montreal
Protocol275:
Costs and Benefits of Montreal Protocol to the United States (in billions of 1985 dollars):
Benefits
Costs
Net Benefits

No Controls

Montreal Protocol

—
—
—

3,575
21
3,554

Unilateral Implementation of Montreal
Protocol by the United States
1,363
21
1,352

It should be clear that for the United States, unilateral action was well-justified,
because the health benefits of American action would create substantial benefits to the
American public. And if the world joined the Montreal Protocol, the benefits would be
nearly tripled, because it would prevent 245 million cancers, including more than five
million cancer deaths.276 One of the most noteworthy features of the ozone depletion
problem is that over time, the United States was anticipated to be a decreasingly large
contributor to that problem. By 2050, no controls were expected to mean a 15.7%
decrease in the ozone layer, whereas unilateral American action would produce a 10.4%
decrease, and the international agreement would result in a mere 1.9% decrease. By 2100,
no controls were expected to mean a 50% decrease; unilateral action a 49% decrease; and
the international agreement a 1.2% decrease.277 In the short-run, aggressive action by the
United States alone was amply justified by the cost-benefit calculus. In the long-run, the
United States would do much better with global cooperation. At the same time, the
expected cost of the Montreal Protocol, a mere $21 billion, greatly dampened public
resistance; and the cost turned out to be even lower than anticipated because of
technological innovation.278
Compare in this regard the relevant figures for the Kyoto Protocol279:
Costs and Benefits of Kyoto Protocol (in billions of 2000 dollars):
No Controls
Benefits
Costs
Net Benefits

—
—
—

Kyoto Protocol
12
325
-313

Unilateral Action to Comply with
Kyoto Protocol
0
325
-325

What is noteworthy here is that the costs of the Kyoto Protocol were much higher
than the costs of the Montreal Protocol (by some $313 billion), and the benefits of the
former were much lower than the benefits of the later (by some $3,562 billion!). For the
Kyoto Protocol, The cost-benefit ratio here is so terrible that from the standpoint of
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American self-interest, a great deal would have to be done to justify American support, at
least from that standpoint. A broader agreement, including China and India in particular,
would significantly increase the benefits of greenhouse gas reduction, simply because it
would include increasingly important contributors to the problem, with developing
countries projected to account for over half of total global emissions by 2020 and
possibly before.280 Hence a broader agreement would significantly increase the benefits
to both the United States and the world.281 It would also be possible to design an
agreement, with global emissions trading and with emissions reduction requirements that
grow over time, that dramatically reduce the costs for America and elsewhere.282
The point is not, however, to suggest an ideal treaty to handle the problem of
climate change. It is only to suggest that American perceptions and behavior are likely to
change only if the assessment of costs and benefits changes as well. A purely
technocratic analysis and good policy design, of the sort that culminated in the Montreal
Protocol, may be sufficient to accomplish that task. But it is reasonable to suspect that in
light of the complexity of the climate change problem, and the inevitably high cost of
addressing it, vivid incidents, real or imagined, will have to play a role.
Conclusion
My principal goal here has been to make some progress in understanding the
divergent American reactions to the risks associated with terrorism and climate change,
and in that way to help explain the existing patterns of law and regulation. The
psychometric account does not fare well. In terms of the qualitative factors emphasized
by those who endorse that account, there is no reason to think that climate change would
produce little public concern; indeed, it might be expected to produce greater concern
than terrorism. The affect heuristic is certainly not falsified by the divergence in people’s
level of concern; affective reactions are consistent with the observed pattern of
regulation. The problem is that affect itself requires explanation, and for that reason it
cannot explain the divergence.
The idea of cultural cognition does help to explain risk perceptions with respect to
climate change. Differences within the American public are correlated with what might
be taken to be different cultural dispositions; environmental activists believe that the
threat is very serious and that Americans should be willing to spend a great deal to reduce
that threat, whereas other groups do not. But Americans generally believe that the risk
associated with terrorism is quite serious, and there is no evidence that with respect to
terrorism, risk perceptions greatly vary along cultural dimensions. As we have seen, the
notion of “cultural cognition” is best broken up into two component mechanisms,
involving normative bias and social influences. Both of these mechanisms play a role in
explaining people’s judgments about climate change and terrorism, and divergences

280

See Sheila M. Olmstead and Robert N. Stavins, An International Policy Architecture for the PostKyoto Era, 96 Am. Econ. Rev. 35, 35-36(Papers and Proceedings) (2006).
281
See Nordhaus and Boyer, supra note, at 123-44; Barrett, supra note, at 379.
282
Id.

42

within the United States can be much better understood in their light; but normative bias
and social influences are hardly the whole story.
The best and most general explanation involves bounded rationality. Intuitive
cost-benefit balancing is a large part of that explanation. Americans believe that they
have relatively little to lose from climate change and that expensive regulation would
mostly help people in other nations in the distant future. Partly for that reason, they are
unwilling to spend a great deal to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Differences in risk
perception are much affected by the availability heuristic, which helps to inform intuitive
cost-benefit balancing. European nations are more concerned about climate change than
the United States in part because certain environmental risks have become more salient in
the former than in the latter, and in part because both intuitive and formal cost-benefit
analysis suggests that with expensive precautionary measures, the United States is more
likely to be a net loser.283
Of course interest-group pressures matter, and such pressures can help both to
shape public perceptions and to affect the likelihood of any regulatory response to those
perceptions. If the public’s analysis of likely costs and benefits shifted, perhaps as a result
of more vivid incidents of tangible harm,284 domestic controls on greenhouse gases, and
American participation in international agreements, would be far more probable. For the
risks associated with climate change, the most serious of which are not likely to come to
fruition in the near future, it is exceedingly difficult to promote availability; but vivid
images are possible to provide here as well. There are multiple equilibria: Single
incidents and small shocks can make an extraordinary difference in terms of law and
regulation.285 With respect to terrorism, the attack of 9/11 was not exactly a small shock,
but a single incident, on a single day, radically altered the associated risk perceptions of
Americans, and greatly affected law as well.
To be sure, what is available to some may not be available to all, in part because
of social influences, and in part because of individual, cultural, and national
predispositions. It follows that some cultures will find risks of climate change “available”
not because of simple facts about what citizens have to gain and to lose, but also because
the relevant citizens are predisposed to focus on some risks rather than others. But even
across cultural differences, intuitive cost-benefit balancing can be altered by available
incidents; if vivid incidents become salient, aggressive regulation is far more likely to be
forthcoming.
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